Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), who has been in the news somewhat lately because Evangelical and Reformed Christians have been celebrating the 300th anniversary of his birth, was an enormously influential theologian of the Puritan era, of the Reformed or Calvinist school, whose writings have helped shape the minds of many of the Reformed theologians of later times. His book, The Freedom of the Will, in particular, has been extremely influential in shaping the theological thinking of later Reformed theologians, such as R.C. Sproul and John M. Frame; and R.C. Sproul has called it “the most important theological work ever produced in America.” I haven’t read the book myself. However, because of the enormous influence he has had on later thinking of Reformed theologians, several people have attempted to summarize his book which can be read online; therefore not having read the book need not deter one from commenting on what it contains. The shortest and most concise summary of the book that I have found is from an article on his book in Wikipedia, which summarizes it in one sentence as follows:
“. . . a person may freely choose whatever seems good, but that whatever it is that seems good is based on an inherent predisposition that has been foreordained by God.” (link)
This in a nutshell sums up his argument. Longer and more detailed summaries of his book also exist, which are more conducive to giving it a more detailed reply. For the rest of this post I am going to rely on the one provided by Matthew Everhard, titled “Freedom of the Will: Synopsis,” which is the best one that I have found so far, and which can be seen here. Skipping the initial introductory part, he begins his summary as follows (capitalizations in the original; other emphasis added):
“The book begins in the author’s preface with an acknowledgement by Edwards that using nicknames like ‘Calvinism’ and ‘Arminianism’ has its downfalls. On the same token, though, sometimes they are necessary to delineate – in the broadest strokes possible – what are the sides and terms of the debate. He admits that he is a Calvinist and will defend this position.
“The book then divides into four major parts. In part one, Edwards lays the groundwork for the rest of the book. He defines philosophical concepts and terms like ‘necessity,’ ‘contingency,’ and ‘ability’ that will be used incessantly throughout. Readers had better pay attention here or be lost forever!
“Of particular importance, Edwards makes a distinction between what he calls ‘moral ability’ and ‘natural ability.’ Natural ability (or inability, as the case may be) has to do with what a man is physically capable of doing. He can walk; but he cannot fly. Moral ability (or conversely, inability) has to do with what a person can or cannot do of their own volition. A drunkard may not be able to stop drinking, for instance, just as a wife of noble character simply cannot cheat on her husband (his examples).
“Edwards then says something that will become the foundation for his entire treatise. Human beings, as responsible moral agents, ALWAYS (without any exception) choose to do what they are most strongly inclined to do at that time. In fact, it is impossible for them NOT to do what they are most inclined or disposed to do. In this way, he will argue throughout, our ‘volition will be determined’.”
That is the foundational premise of his argument, as well as his greatest theological error—and of all those who have been influenced by him. There is no logical, scriptural, or experiential basis for the assumption that mankind must necessarily always without exception choose to do what they are most strongly inclined to do at that time, and that it is impossible for them to do otherwise. There is no justification for this in scripture, reason, or human experience. Both scripture and experience tells us that man has the moral ability to determine whether a given course of action is morally right or morally wrong, and then to act contrary to his “inclination” or “predisposition” if his moral judgement tells him that would be the wrong thing to do.
Throughout the Bible mankind have been exhorted by God, and by his prophets, to do good and abstain from evil—with the promise of a reward or punishment at the end, either in this life or the next (or both). It would make God a hypocrite and a liar to exhort mankind to do good and abstain from evil—and be rewarded accordingly—if they were powerless to do so unless he made them to, “inclined” them to, or predestined them to. Human experience also tells us that we have the moral ability to determine the right and wrong of a situation, and make moral choices based on that determination—even contrary to our own “inclination” if need be. Matthew Everhard then continues his summary as follows (words in square brackets added):
“But lest we think that Edwards is a mere fatalist, he will also argue that because this choosing is according to our own strongest inclinations [as predestined], it is also completely consistent with liberty [freewill]. We freely choose what we want most [as predestined]. For this reason, Edwards has been called a ‘compatibilist’ (i.e. that human liberty is logically compatible with divine sovereignty).”
There are several issues here that need to be separated:
1) His argument that the choices we make are predetermined by our “inclination” towards that choice, but still are “consistent with library” (i.e. are freely made), is a logical fallacy, and a contradiction in terms. It is a self-contradictory statement. It is simply illogical—unless you redefined the meaning of “freedom” and “liberty” completely.
2) That argument also negates man’s ability to make moral or ethical decisions, and to act accordingly. There are two kinds of choices that people can make: moral choices and amoral choices. Moral choices are those which have a moral or ethical dimension: they can be either “right” or “wrong;” such as the decision whether to steal someone’s money or not to. Amoral choices don’t have a moral or ethical dimension. They are neither “right” nor “wrong,” such as the decision what color tie I should wear when I go to work this morning. It is moral choices that are of interest to us in this discussion. Edwards’ premise effectively negates man’s ability to make moral choices, which is contrary to both experience as well as biblical teachings. Everyone knows within himself that he is capable of making such decisions; and the repeated biblical injunction to mankind to do good, and abstain from evil, also presupposes man’s ability to make such decisions. If Edwards’ premise was correct, that would negate man’s ability to make moral choices, and make God a hypocrite and a liar to repeatedly enjoin them to do good and abstain from evil (with a promise of a reward or punishment), knowing all along that they would be incapable of doing so unless he made them to, “inclined” them to, or predestined them to.
3) Edwards’ premise, if it were true, would deny human freewill (despite his protestations to the contrary), which would be neither “compatible” nor “incompatible” with the sovereignty of God. Therefore calling it “compatibilist” is a misnomer. The sovereignty of God neither demands predestination, nor is it incompatible with full libertarian freewill. The assumption that it is, is a false premise of Calvinism, and is not true.
Matthew Everhard then continues his summary of Edwards’ book as follows:
“Part two, quite honestly, is pretty boring in some respects. Over and over Edwards will repeat the same argument from every possible angle. Here, he will show how it is impossible to make any choice whatsoever from a completely neutral perspective (as his opponents suggest). Every decision, he says, is made for a reason that springs from one’s already determined inclinations [i.e. as predestined]. His opponents (both named and theoretical) will suggest that to be truly free, one must be able to make a decision from a completely neutral, unbiased, blank-slate, position of ‘liberty.’ Edwards says this cannot be so.”
Which again completely ignores and denies the moral dimension of man’s decision making process. Man is not only a volitional creature, but also a moral creature. He doesn’t make decisions purely on the basis of his “strongest inclination” as Edwards suggests. If that is what he did, he wouldn’t be any different than the beasts of the field. Man’s “inclination” alone does not determine what course of action he will take, but also his ability to make moral choices. If his “inclination” is to better himself at the expense of someone else by stealing their money; but his moral judgement tells him that that would be the wrong thing to do; he is able to act contrary to his “inclination,” and follow his moral judgement instead—which is what makes him accountable before God. Edwards’ theology denies man’s ability to make moral decisions, which is contrary to both experience as well as the teaching of the Bible. It is a denial of human accountability, which is written all over the Bible. It is a heresy. There is no other way to describe it. Matthew Everhard then continues his summary as follows:
“For example, suppose we are choosing between two paths home (my analogy, not Edwards’s). One is shorter and quicker, the other is longer and more dangerous. Whenever we choose a path, we do so for some reason. We are never neutral. Perhaps we want to get home sooner. Perhaps we want the scenic view. But always something determines the choice. Even if we were to choose for no consciously known reason, there must be some reason we prefer the one path over the other.”
Except that it is not a good analogy, because it does not have a moral dimension. Whichever choice is made in that example, is neither “right” nor “wrong” from a moral or ethical point of view. I can suggest a better analogy, which does include a moral dimension. Suppose I am walking home someday, and discover my neighbor’s wallet on the ground, which had fallen out of his pocket without him realizing it. I pick it up and take it home, and discover that there is $200 in it. I have a choice to either steal his money, and destroy the evidence without anybody finding out; or else to return his wallet without expecting anything in return. My “inclination” might be to line my pocket at his expense by stealing his money. My moral judgement, however, tells me that it would be a morally indefensible thing to do, and I should return his wallet back to him. Am I irresistibly bound to follow my “inclination,” as Edwards suggests? I don’t think so. Both experience as well as biblical teaching suggests otherwise. As a free moral agent, I have the freedom and ability to act against my “inclination” and return his wallet back to him, because my moral judgement tells me that that is the “right” thing to do. Edwards’ thesis negates man’s ability to make such a moral judgement, which is contrary to both experience as well as the word of God. Matthew then continues his summary as follows:
“Part two does heat up however, towards the later stages of the section, where Edwards begins to talk about God’s foreknowledge and employs a flurry of Scriptural citations. Biblicists will love this part! Here, he argues that all human choices in time are already known by God (which the Arminians also admit). But if they are known to God beforehand, they are also as sure to come to pass in the future as if God were seeing them from the perspective of the past. With God, there is no difference between seeing a future event and a past one. Both are certain in his all-knowing mind.”
That is true; but the underlying assumption of it, that man’s decisions therefore are not freely made, or that man is predestined, is false. That is the underlying premise of Calvinism, which is false. Calvinism sees libertarian freewill to be incompatible with divine sovereignty and foreknowledge of God, which is not true. The two concepts are not logically incompatible, contrary to Calvinist thinking. Matthew then continues his summary as follows:
“In part three, Edwards then attempts to answer an important question: if we are already predisposed to either good or evil (remember, we always choose according to our inclinations) what is the point of calling a choice morally ‘good’ or ‘bad’? Besides, how can helping an old woman across the street be praise-worthy, if it has already been determined that I must do so? Should I get any credit for that? On the same token, how can we blame a thief for doing exactly what his constitution requires him to do? If he must steal, how is it his fault?
“Edwards answers this by replying that one’s disposition is exactly what makes a person’s actions worthy of praise (or blame) in the first place. Suppose the Good Samaritan helped the poor mangled traveler in Luke 10 from a completely neutral heart. He felt nothing in his heart either way about the helpless man’s condition. He tosses a coin and it comes up ‘help him’ rather than ‘leave him.’ Would this be more praiseworthy than if his disposition cared deeply? Of course not! His concerned disposition is exactly what prompts him to help, and the reason why his action is worthy of commendation. Besides, Edwards argues, God Himself is completely and absolutely disposed to holy action and cannot do otherwise, and He is the most praiseworthy being in the universe! Surely we do not find fault in Him for acting righteously from a determined, necessary inclination to do what is good, do we?”
That is a logically flawed argument, and circular (and dishonest) reasoning. His argument goes like this: man is predestined by God to act as he does. That predestination works by God “predisposing” him to follow a certain course of action which he is unable to resist. What makes his actions “praiseworthy” (if good), or “blameworthy” (if bad), is precisely because he is “predisposed” (i.e. predestined) to the one course or the other. Where is the logic in that? I don’t see one. He is saying that you are predestined to do as you do; but your decisions are still freely made because you freely choose what you are predestined to do! Your actions are then praiseworthy (if good), or blameworthy (if bad), precisely because you are predestined to do as you do. Well, R.C. Sproul may have been convinced by that, but I am not!
That argument is also flawed because it completely ignores man’s ability to act as a moral agent, and make choices not only on the basis of what he is “inclined” or “predisposed” to do, but also on the basis of what his moral judgement tells him is the right (or wrong) thing to do. James in the New Testament says, “Therefore to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin.” (James 4:17) To “sin” is to knowingly do what one knows to be wrong, without being constrained (read “predestined!”) to do so. If you don’t know right from wrong, you are not sinning if you do wrong. But if you know right from wrong, the implication of that verse is that you have the ability to act against your own “inclination” or “predisposition” to do wrong, and do right instead. James again says, “Resist the devil, and he will flee from you.” (James 4:7). The implication of that again is that we are not obliged to follow our evil “inclination;” but are able to resist it and act against it if we will. Another quote from James: “Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man:” (James 1:13). God does not “tempt” anyone, nor “incline” nor “predispose” anyone to do evil; only the devil does. Jonathan Edwards is confusing God with devil! He is attributing the devil’s work to God, and God’s work to the devil! And man is always able to resist the temptations of the devil if he so chooses, because “God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able;” (1 Cor. 10:13). (No wonder Martin Luther hated the Epistle of James!) It is the devil who tempts man to do evil, not God, as the Book of Mormon affirms (punctuation revised):
Moroni 7:
12 Wherefore all things which are good cometh of God; and that which is evil cometh of the devil. For the devil is an enemy unto God, and fighteth against him continually, and inviteth and enticeth to sin, and to do that which is evil continually.
13 But behold, that which is of God inviteth and enticeth to do good continually. Wherefore everything which inviteth and enticeth to do good, and to love God, and to serve him, is inspired of God.
And no one is “predestined” to do evil (or good). Jonathan Edwards’ teaching is a complete negation of man’s moral agency enshrined in the Bible, and is an undeniable heresy. There is no other way to describe it. How could intelligent folks like R.C. Sproul or John M. Frame fall for this kind of thing is puzzling, to say the least. Matthew then continues his summary of Edwards’ book as follows:
“In the last part, part four, Edwards considers a host of objections against his position that are still made to this day. For instance: doesn’t moral necessity (that we must do what we are inclined to do) make human beings mere machines? Isn’t this another restatement of the Greek concept of fate? Doesn’t this make God the author of sin by creating us with sinful dispositions?
“Whether or not we view Edwards’s answers to these questions as satisfying will in large part be determined (no pun intended!) by whether we’ve found his prior arguments about moral and natural necessity coherent and convincing.
“Of particular help to many will be Edwards’s formal conclusion itself. In this last flurry, Edwards works through each of the primary doctrinal pieces of the famous Reformed acronym TULIP in turn. With a winsome defense of Calvinism, Edwards arrives at his argument’s denouement – God’s grace is absolutely necessary to overturn the sinful heart of the rebellious person and turn them to Jesus. But in doing so, God also graciously ‘rewires’ our predispositions so that we freely and willingly choose to savor Christ and follow Him by faith.”
That is Calvinistic “grace,” which is anything but! However, I do have a question to ask those who are influenced by, and are well versed in Jonathan Edwards’ book: does he have an answer to my objection to his theology, which is based on man’s ability to act as a moral agent? The scriptures teach that man is not only a volitional creature, but also a moral creature. He is able to make choices, not only on the basis of his “inclinations” and “predispositions,” but also on the basis of his ability to determine whether a certain course of action is morally right or morally wrong, and then to decide, if need be, to act against his “inclination” because his moral judgement tells him that it might not be the right thing to do. Does Jonathan Edwards attempt to answer that objection; and if so, how? I hope someone will be able to answer that question for me, because I really like to know. Matthew then concludes his summary of Edwards’ book with these words:
“Well there you have it. The Freedom of the Will in just under about a thousand words. Now go get yourself a copy so you can work through it yourself. Happy reading!”
Thank you Matthew Everhard for your excellent summary of Jonathan Edwards’ book. It saved me the trouble of having to read it! đŸ˜€ There are several other summaries of Edwards’ book on the Internet of course, which a Google search can find for those who may be interested.
